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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Court err in not ruling that good cause existed

to enter a Nunc Pro Tunc Order modifying the Decree of Divorce
previously entered on November 28, 1973?
2.

Did the Court err in applying and giving retroactive

effect to the legal reguirements set forth in Brown v. Brown, 744 P. 2d
333 (Utah, App. 1987)?

3.

Did the Court err in not estopping the Plaintiff from

enforcing a Judgment for alimony?
4. Did the Court err in finding that the Plaintiff, by making
representations that alimony did not exist in the Decree and that
she would sign an agreement vacating the alimony, waived her right
to alimony after November, 1973?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-4a~l (1953, as amended),

states

as follows :

"A Court having jurisdiction may, upon it's finding of good
cause and giving of such notice as may be ordered, enter an
Order Nunc Pro Tunc in a matter relating to marriage, divorce,
legal separation or annulment of marriage."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
A Divorce Decree was entered in this case, based upon the

Default Consent signed by the Defendant without an attorney, on
January 10, 1973. In that Decree, the Defendant was ordered to pay
to the Plaintiff $200.00 per month as alimony pursuant to Paragraph
3 of the Divorce Decree.

The Defendant filed an Order to Show

Cause seeking modification of the Decree and termination of the
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alimony award, dated June 13, 1973. The matter was brought on for
hearing on November 28, 1973, at which time the Minute Entry
reflected that a written Stipulation was reached between the
parties.
On February 25, 1988, the Plaintiff filed with the Court an
Order to Show Cause seeking Judgment for unpaid alimony arrearages
for the 8 years preceding the Order to Show Cause.

The Defendant

moved the Court to enforce the previous Stipulation referred to in
the November 24, 1973 minutes. The Defendant reguested the Court
enter the Order, Nunc Pro Tunc, terminating the alimony or, in the
alternative, to find that the Plaintiff had cohabited since the
date of the Divorce Decree and was no longer entitled to any award
of alimony.
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

found that the Plaintiff was

entitled to a Judgment against the Defendant in the sum of
$19,400.00 because there was not an enforceable Stipulation entered
into between the parties. The Court did not find that no agreement
took

place, but

enforceable.

found

instead

that

the

agreement

was

not

The Court also ruled that the Plaintiff did not

unlawfully cohabitate subseguent to the entry of the Divorce
Decree.
The Plaintiff received a Judgment based upon the written
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order entered by the
Court and the Defendant/Appellant has filed a timely Appeal.
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B.

Course of Proceeding.
The Complaint was filed in this case on April 7, 1972 (file

document

000002).

A

Decree was

entered

January

10, 1973,

originally pursuant to a Stipulation of the parties and the Default
of the Defendant in 1973 concerning the Default Divorce (see
attachments).

At the time the Divorce Decree was entered, the

Defendant was not represent by counsel. After the Divorce Decree
was entered, the Defendant obtained legal counsel who filed a
Petition for Order to Show Cause on May 17, 1973 alleging that the
Decree of Divorce provided for alimony contrary to representations
made by the Plaintiff to the Defendant that there would be no
alimony (see file document 000016, attachment 1). An Order to Show
Cause was entered on June 26, 1973 (see attachment 2).
The Defendant's Petition for Order to Show Cause was noticed
for hearing on November 28, 1973. The Minute Entry indicated that
based on the Stipulation of respective counsel, the Court ordered
that the Order to Show Cause was continued

pending written

Stipulation and Order (see file document 000023, attached).

The

trial Judge at that time was the Honorable G. Hal Taylor.
When the Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause in February,
1988, to enforce alimony, this matter came on first before the
Domestic Relations Commissioner of the Court, Sandra Peuler. The
Commissioner entered a recommendation ruling in favor of the
Plaintiff and the Defendant filed an objection. The objection came
on for hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick of the
Court and an evidentiary hearing was held before the Court on July
4

21, 1988. The Defendant called, as witnesses, both the Plaintiff
and Defendant's prior attorneys, and his present wife, Darlene
Bagshaw.

The Plaintiff called as a witness the Plaintiff, Wanda

Marie Sackett Bagshaw as a witness.
The Court took the matter under advisement and after receiving
Memorandum from the parties, entered a Minute Entry which states:
This Court is not persuaded that the parties arrived
at an enforceable Stipulation to modify the Decree of
Divorce to eliminate alimony.

Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah

App., 1987).

C.

Disposition at Trial Court.
The Plaintiff received a Judgment against the Defendant for

the sum of $19,400*00 to and including unpaid child support due to
March 31, 1988 and each party was ordered to assume their own
attorney's fees and costs.
RELEVANT FACTS
At the hearing, the Defendant called to the stand Darlene
Bagshaw, the Defendant's new wife, who appeared with him at the
time of the hearing on November 28, 19 73.

She indicated that she

came with Mr. Bagshaw to the hearing which took place in the Third
District Court (Transcript, Page 3).

She testified that on the day

before the hearing, she received a telephone call from the
Plaintiff, the Defendant's ex-wife, Wanda Bagshaw (Page 4). She
heard Joseph Bagshaw indicate to Wanda Bagshaw that there was Court
on the following day and he made a threat to her concerning Court
(Pg. 4).

The next day, she appeared with her husband at Court

where they met her husband's attorney, Mr. Gilbert Athay.
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The

witness recalled that Wanda Bagshaw1s lawyer came up to them and
indicated that Wanda was not going to appear that day because she
was upset concerning the threats Joe had made to her (Pg. 5). She
testified that on the day of the Court hearing, that the two
attorneys, Wanda

Bagshaw*s

attorney

and

her

husband, Joseph

Bagshaw1 s, attorney, went into a small room in the back of the
Courtroom at which conversations took place concerning settling the
case that day (Pg. 7).

She indicated that her husband, Mr.

Bagshaw, said that he would let go of his claim concerning the Jeep
and his portion of a Federal Tax Return, which Wanda Bagshaw had
taken and also agreed not to press charges against her for theft
concerning the Jeep in exchange for her dropping the alimony
charges.

She recalled that Mr. Bagshaw had stated during the

meeting that he didn't know that there had been alimony provisions
placed in the Divorce Decree until his brother had read the Decree
to him.
Darlene Bagshaw testified that an agreement was reached over
the phone and that her lawyer represented that she was talking to
Wanda Bagshaw and Wanda Bagshaw indicated that she had agreed to
the settlement.

She indicated that the attorneys were to draw up

a Stipulation, that his portion of the Federal check was to go
towards child support and that Joe would not press any theft
charges concerning the Jeep and that the alimony would be dropped
from the Divorce Decree (Pg. 8).
She indicated that after the meeting, her husband attempted
to call attorney Gil Athay on several occasions to see whether or
6

not the papers had been completed (Pg. 9)* Even though the papers
were never completed, she indicated that her husband believed that
the alimony amounts had been paid (Pg. 10).
Joseph Arthur Bagshaw was sworn as a witness and testified
that at the time he signed the document allowing her to proceed to
a default divorce, that he did not have an attorney and did not
read at the time (Pg. 13). Mr. Bagshaw testified that his wife at
the time, Wanda Bagshaw, in a telephone conversation from St.
George, Utah said that she wanted a quick divorce and child support
and that he merely sign the papers at the place where she indicated
that he needed to sign and mail them back to her (Pg. 14). He
indicated that after the Divorce Decree was entered, his brother
read the Decree to him and he found out for the first time that he
was paying $200.00 in alimony (Pg. 15). After trying to contact
Mrs. Bagshaw concerning the alimony, he retained Robert Van Sciver
to act as his attorney and on May 17, 1973, he signed a document
which was a Petition for Order to Show Cause.
1.

That he is the Defendant in the above-entitled matter.
That he is unable to read and that it was represented to
the Defendant by the Plaintiff that he, if he executed
certain documents, there would be no alimony.

2.

That the Decree of Divorce entered herein provides for
alimony and based upon such misrepresentations, the
Defendant acquiesced in securing of a Decree of Divorce.
Therefore, the same should be modified eliminating that
provision relating to alimony.

3.

Further, there has been the taking, by the Plaintiff of
Income Tax Return, a portion of which should be paid to
the Defendant. (See Petition for Order to Show Cause
entered July 13, 1973 as part of the record in this
matter, attached hereto.)
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Mr. Bagshaw indicated that on the day of Court on November 28,
1973, an agreement was reached that there would be no alimony if
he would drop the charges of her taking the Jeep and the Federal
check (Pg. 18). He indicated that "half the check would go to her and half would
come to me but then we agreed that all of it would go to her because" he was giving her

his portion of the check as credit for child support. He indicated
that she agreed to drop the alimony based upon his foregoing of
filing any theft charges against her concerning the taking of the
Jeep and that he fulfilled his part of the bargain by not pursuing
the theft charges.

In his presence at the time of the meeting

between the attorneys on the day in question, he stated that he
heard her attorney, Spencer Haycock, indicate that she had agreed
to the proposal (Pg. 19). From the time of the Court hearing on
November 28, 1973 until he received the Order to Show Cause in
February, 1988, his ex-wife, Wanda, did not make any claims for any
alimony, even though she did bring an action concerning child
support through the Department of Social Services
Exhibits were introduced

(Pg. 20).

in this matter that indicated that

documents were served on him in February, 1986 concerning the child
support obligations which were initiated by the Plaintiff, Wanda
Bagshaw. On July 16, 1987, he reached an agreement fully settling
the child support debt with the Department of Recovery Services
(Pg. 21 and Exhibit "3").
Mr. Bagshaw testified that in 1975, his ex-wife, Wanda
Bagshaw, informed him that she was expecting a child and was
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pregnant (Pg. 24). Mr. Bagshaw stated that he had not had sexual
relations with her and was not the father of the child (Pg. 25).
He indicated that it was not until February of 1988 that he
discovered that she was still making a claim for alimony despite
the agreement of November, 1973 (Pg. 26).
The Defendant called as witnesses, both of the attorneys
representing the parties at the November 28, 1973 hearing.

D.

Gilbert Athay testified that in 1973 he was a partner with Robert
Van Sciver, the attorney who filed the Petition on behalf of Mr.
Bagshaw (Transcript Vol. II, pg. 4).

Mr. Athay testified that

after hearing the testimony of Darlene Bagshaw and Joseph Bagshaw,
that he did not have a recollection as to the events of November,
1973 (Pg. 5).
The Plaintiff's attorney in 1973 was Mr. Spencer Haycock (Pg.
7).

Mr. Haycock testified that he, like Mr. Athay, did not have

any independent recollection of the November 28th hearing. He did
say that he had a limited recollection that his client had cashed
a check and sold the Jeep and that the parties had come back to
Court (Pg. 9).
The Defendant/Appellant also called as a witness Joseph Lavar
Bagshaw (Vol. II, Pg 32).

He testified that he was the son of the

parties and lived with his mother, the Plaintiff, after the Divorce
until 1980.

In 1975, his mother gave birth to another child.

Prior to that time, he saw male individuals at the residence but
could not testify as to whether these persons stayed overnight.
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Wanda Marie Sackett Bagshaw was called to testify as to her
recollection of the proceedings (Vol. II, Pg. 15). She testified
that she knew her ex-husband had retained an attorney and that she
met with the attorneys (Pg. 17). She acknowledged that there was
a dispute with her ex-husband over a Federal check and the Jeep
automobile (Pg. 19). She stated that she did not verbally agree
to waive alimony.
The Plaintiff/Respondent admitted that she gave birth to a
child in 1975 (Pg. 26).

She also testified that in 1972 she

assigned to the Department of Recovery Service of the State of Utah
the right to receive child support and alimony (Pg. 17).
acknowledged

that from 1972 until

She

1981, she received public

assistance and for a few months in 1984 (Pg. 16). She stated that
during this period of time when she was receiving assistance, she
was required to pay over any money she received for alimony to the
Department of Recovery Services (Pg. 17).

The Assignment of

Collection of Support Payments was filed with the Court in 19 75
when the State of Utah, Department of Social Services was joined
as a party (see file document 000024 and 000025, attached).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Did the Court err in not ruling that good cause existed

to enter a Nunc Pro Tunc Order modifying the Decree of Divorce
previously entered on November 28, 1973?
2.

Did the Court err in applying and giving retroactive

effect to the legal requirements set forth in Brown v. Brown, "44 P. 2d 333
(Utah, App.

1987)?
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3.

Did the Court err in not estopping the Plaintiff from

enforcing a Judgment for alimony?
4. Did the Court err in finding that the Plaintiff, by making
representations that alimony did not exist in the Decree and that
she would sign an agreement vacating the alimony, waived her right
to alimony after November, 1973?
ARGUMENT
POINT I
GOOD CAUSE EXISTS FOR THE COURT TO ENTER A NUNC
PRO TUNC ORDER MODIFYING THE DECREE AS OF
NOVEMBER 28,1973, BASED ON EITHER THE STIPULATION
OR THE MERITS OF THE PENDING ACTION.
Utah Code Annotated. 30-4a-l (As Amended, 1984) states:

A Court having jurisdiction may, upon its
findings of good cause and giving of such
notice as may be ordered, enter an order Nunc
Pro Tunc in a matter relating to marriage,
divorce, legal separation or annulment of
marriage.
The first case interpreting this broad and remedial statute
which is unique in Utah to domestic proceedings is the recent case
of Home v. Home, 737 P.2d, 244 (Utah App. 1987).

In this decision the Court

of Appeals set forth for the first time the parameters of the Nunc
Pro Tunc statute giving discretion to a court to grant special
relief in domestic matters when errors or omissions occur.

The

Defendant

had

respectfully

submits

that

the

trial

Court

jurisdiction and authority to enter an order modifying the alimony
provision of the Bagshaw Decree as of November 28, 1973, setting
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aside and vacating the alimony provisions on agreement of the
parties under the authority of the statute.
In Home,

the Court of Appeals discussed

in detail the

legislative history of Utah Code Annotated, 30-4a-I% (1984) f and indicated

that the history of the Nunc Pro Tunc statute revealed "an intent
to give to the courts broad discretion to enter orders Nunc Pro
Tunc in domestic proceedings where an obvious injustice would
otherwise result." The Court found that the statute applied to all
aspects of domestic proceedings and was not limited to cases
involving only marital status of the parties as under the former
statue which it replaced.
Under common law and previous Utah decisions, the doctrine of
Nunc Pro Tunc required a condition precedent that the Court find
that a previous final order has been made at an earlier date. See
for example, Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 288. (Utah, 1984).

Thus, prior

to

enactment of the statute, an order could only be entered after a
previously

final

order, a court

could

remedy

only

a prior

accomplished act which arose to the status of a final order.
The Court in Home ruled that the analysis and holding of Preece
v. Preece, was statutorily overruled and that unlike common law, the
Court only needs to find "good cause" to correct errors or supply
omissions.

The Court held that the statute gives to courts wide

discretion to prevent "obvious injustices", and to accurately
reflect that which in fact took place without the technical
restraints under previous law.
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The Utah Court of Appeals stated:
"The meaning of 'good cause1 must be
determined on a case by case basis, in light
of all of the surrounding circumstances, or
equity and justice required.
The Court, in reversing the trial Courtfs application of the
statute in the Home divorce, indicated that the statute should be
applied to give effect to the partiesf prior intentions and not to
substitute the Court's judgment for the judgment of the parties*
Mr. Bagshaw proved to the trial Court that he would suffer an
obvious injustice if the trial Court did not enter a Nunc Pro Tunc
Order modifying the alimony provisions of the Decree.

Judgment

was entered against him and in favor of the Plaintiff for alimony
which he had reasonably believed was resolved by Stipulation
fifteen years prior to Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause. The
Plaintiff, Mrs. Bagshaw, on the other hand, admitted that she did
not demand or prosecute her purported claim for alimony until only
recently, even though there had been payment demands and full
payment of child support.
The Defendant

established

good

cause under

the

special

circumstances of this case, upon which the Court could have
enforced the agreement, or granted Motion on the merits.

Those

include any of the following:
1.

The original decree was a default decree based upon the
Plaintiff's misrepresentation that no alimony would be
in the decree.

2*

At the time of the Consent to Enter Default, the
Defendant could not read and relied on the Plaintiff,
without consulting an attorney.
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3.

The hearing was noticed by Defendant's counsel for the
date of November 28, 1973 and not by Plaintiff's counsel.

4.

The Defendant's testimony and minute entry reflects that
the parties intended to file a written stipulation to be
reduced to an order and the alimony issue was the primary
contention between the parties.

5.

The Defendant forgave his claim for the funds from the
forgery of his name on the check and the unauthorized
taking of the Jeep and the Plaintiff admitted to the
unauthorized acts.

6.

The Plaintiff assigned to a governmental third party
agency the right to collect alimony and had never
actively pursued her claim until 1988 (see Exhibit
concerning assignment with Recovery Services).

7.

No alimony collection proceedings were ever instituted
by the Plaintiff after November 28, 1973, until the
present action, or the Department of Recovery Services
even though the Defendant fully resolved and satisfied
all child support claims.

8.

The Defendant was present in Utah and was not aware of
the omission to formally enter the stipulation and was
never notified of the omission by any enforcement by the
Plaintiff.

9.

The Order to Show Cause was continued pending the
Stipulation and the matter was still pending and had
never been adjudicated.

The broad remedial power to correct injustices in domestic
matters under Utah Code Annotated, 30-4a-l (1984), should have been invoked
by the Court in this matter. The Defendant does not need to prove
the existence of a written stipulation or unsigned court order
under the broad powers granted under the statute as interpreted by
the Court in Home v. Home.

In Home, the Court noted that even under

the common law power of Nunc Pro Tunc, the Court was allowed to
correct errors or supply omissions to the record
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accurately

reflecting that which in fact took place.

The Court could and

should have considered the merits of the Defendant's Petition which
had newr been denied or dismissed.
The expanded scope of the doctrine under the statute should
include errors by attorneys in submitting orders as well as the
traditional clerical errors. In a domestic matter, the trial Court
has continuing equity jurisdiction and the Court should have
rendered the unjust, harsh and inequitable situation created
without fault of the Defendant personally. This case presents the
exact type of situation which the legislature designed the Nunc Pro
Tunc Statute. That is, a technical defect unnoticed by one party
and not prosecuted by the other party that is brought to the
Court's

attention

pursuant

to the continuing

power

to make

equitable decisions in domestic matters.
Therefore, the Court should reverse the trial Court decision
and enter an order effective November 28, 1973 setting aside and
vacating the alimony provision of the Decree.
The Court did not consider entering the Order Nunc Pro Tunc
and, instead, merely found the agreement unenforceable because it
had not been reduced to a writing. The record itself reflects that
the Defendant's Order to Show Cause to vacate alimony was continued
pending a written Stipulation (see attachment 4).
The Nunc Pro Tunc statute was designed to avoid the injustice
which results from the trial Court's technical application of Brown
v. Brown and in not considering this matter beyond the Stipulation.
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The Court should have ruled that the alimony should have been
modified and then retroactively entered this Order to avoid the
harsh injustice of the ruling.
The Defendant's Petition to Modify the Decree, pending since
1973, has never been denied.

The trial Court should have ruled

that the alimony should have been vacated and used the Nunc Pro
Tunc statutes to enter the Order as of 1973.

The Court did not

have to enforce the Stipulation and could have ruled on the merits
because,

under

the

Plaintiff's

theory,

the

Stipulation

was

unenforceable because it was not technically signed or entered.
The Nunc Pro Tunc statutes gave the Court the power to inquire
into this injustice.

Instead, the Court refused to consider this

matter and enforced the alimony without consideration of the
remedial statute.
POINT II
THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED THE REQUIREMENTS OF
BROWN V. BROWN TO FIND THE STIPULATION UNENFORCEABLE.
The Judge ruled in this case that the parties had not arrived
at an enforceable Stipulation to Modify the Decree of Divorce and
specifically cited the recent case of Brown v. Brown, 744 P. 2d 333 (Utah App.,
1987).

In Brown, the Court of Appeals ruled that under Utah Rules of
Practice

of the District Court, 4.5

(b), a stipulation not

continued in a writing signed by the parties or filed with the
clerk was not an enforceable stipulation. In Brown, the Court noted
in discussing what constituted a stipulation, that stipulations
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could

be

enforceable

to

the

extent

that

justice

requires

enforcement in view of potential change of position in reliance on
the

promise

or

agreement

(Citing

Contracts, Section 94 (1987)).

Re

Statement

(Second) of

The Brown Court also quoted a

section of American Jurisprudence, which stated that stipulations
could be asserted if 'entered upon the Minutes of the Court'•
In Brown, the Court said that the Statute of Frauds and Rules
of Practice 4.5 (b), that Stipulation was made not in Court in the
context of a hearing, but at a Deposition where the agreement was
read on the record by the attorneys.
However, in 1973, there was no rule in effect such as Rule 4.5
(b) of the Utah Rules of Practice. The trial Court should not have
applied the ruling and requirements of Brown v. Brown, which was based
upon the rule of practice to the 1973 Stipulation.

In Jensen v. Fames,

519 P. 2d 236 (Utah, 1974), the Utah Supreme Court announced the basic rule
that rules of procedure, if it impairs rights of a party, should
not be applied and that only if there is no impairment, that the
amended procedure will be applied (see also Cheny v. Rucker, 381 P. 2d 86
(Utah, 1963) and Utah Sand and Gravel v. Tolbert, 402 P. 2d 703 (Utah, 1965).

The Court should not have applied the technical requirements
of Brown v. Brown in this case and should have proceeded to determine
whether the Stipulation to terminate alimony should have been
enforced under the Nunc Pro Tunc statute.

In this case, the

hearing of November 1973, was being held on the Petition and Notice
of the Defendant to vacate the alimony provisions.
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The parties

were present at the Court and a Minute Entry was filed indicating
the Order to Show Cause of the Defendant was continued pending
written Stipulation and Order (see attachment 4).
In any event, the Court should not have denied the Petition
by not considering the power to enter an Order under the Nunc Pro
Tunc statute. The requirements of Brown were applied retroactively
in a case where the merits should have been reviewed under the
Court's equity power.
POINT III
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT
FINDING, UNDER CONTINUING EQUITY JURISDICTION,
THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED FROM REDUCING THE
ALIMONY AWARD TO A JUDGMENT.
In cases such as Larsen v. Larsen, 300 P.2d, 596 (Utah, 1956) and Ross v. Ross,

592 P.2d 600 (Utah, 1919), the Utah Courts have recognized that under
equitable jurisdiction of the Court, a party may be estopped from
enforcing the provisions of a divorce decree. In those cases, the
party must prove that the other party by her representations or
actions led him to believe he need not pay alimony and the party
in reliance on such representations damaged his position to his
detriment.

In such cases, the hardship and injustice because of

enforcement of the decree under the circumstances is the reason for
applying the doctrine of estoppel.
The cases relied on by the Plaintiff such as Scott v. Scott, 430 P.2d
580 (Utah, 1967), involve enforcement issues concerning foreign divorces
and do not overrule Larsen and Ross.

In the case before the trial

Court, the Decree was originally entered by the Court and this
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The Defendant .-ciiMui. .. ,acatcrtJ^,.^. ^ w'as still
pending when the Plaintiff attempted to obtain a
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CONCLUSION
The Defendant/Appellant discovered that his Petition to Set
Aside

the

Alimony

was

never

formally

resolved

when

the

Plaintiff/Respondent sought to enforce alimony for the first time
since 1973.

The trial Court did not attempt to remedy the

injustice by ruling on the merits of the original Petition or by
applying the Nunc Pro Tunc statute*

Instead, the trial Court

focused on the "enforceability" of the Stipulation*
This

Court

should

confront

the

issue

raised

by

the

Defendant/Appellant by either determining that the Nunc Pro Tunc
statute was

applicable

and

reversing

and

setting

aside the

Judgment, or in the alternative, remanding this matter back for a
new hearing with directions to the trial Court to consider the
merits of the still pending Petition to Set Aside the Alimony
Provisions under the broad remedial powers of the Nunc Pro Tunc
statute as interpreted by this Court.

RANDALL GMTHER
Attprney for Defendant-Appellant
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant was hand delivered to Mr. John Spencer
Snow, Attorney at Law, 261 East 300 South, Suite 350, Salt Lake
City, Utah

84111, on this

day of February, 1989.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

""BTfr^iv. 3)17
WANDA MARIE SACKETT BAGSHAW,

1-11*13 %m hM,

Plaintiff,
-vs-

DECREE OF DIVORCE

JOSEPH ARTHUR BAGSHAW,
Defendant.

Civil No. D-6775

The above entitled cause having come on regularly for
hearing, Plaintiff being present in person and represented by counsel, Spencer L. Haycock, and the Defendant not appearing nor being
represented by counsel but it appearing to the Court that the
Defendant has heretofore filed his waiver and appearance wherein he
waived time in which to answer or otherwise plead and consented
that the matter may be heard at any time without further notice to
him; and the default of the Defendant having been entered and the
Court having heard the sworn testimony of the Plaintiff and being
fully advised in the premises and the Court having filed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, therefore, upon motion of
Spencer L. Haycock, attorney for Plaintiff, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce dissolving

the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore existing between the
parties; provided, however, that said Decree shall not become final
until the expiration of three months from the date of its entry
herein.

Provided further that said Decree shall not become final

if during said period proceedings for review are pending or the
Court otherwise orders.
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two m i n o r
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3
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:>b* :-

the custody,

care

"i iJD~J ee t
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$200.00 per merit;; *s
=

(

Defendant.
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; 11 i M w • 11
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..

*-f

. . .

t

' r.-- **
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z

-

3

.•,..--

..CL J.:

nine-lid i t i hi' medical expenses, that he provide an adequate p o l i c y
of hea1th ii isurance for s a i d c h i l d r e n .
4
furnishings,

T-.^t p l a i n t i t f is awarded the household goods and
and tne 1962 Ford automeb. -

award ed the I 9iS 2 Jeer

*hs*

:s

Defender*

* a t - ^nob . I *.-

and cair
•=.!,: id:

-..-. _ a e r e d t o assume and pay the d e b t s

e..u ^^-iyo Lions i. near red d^nr.u - e course of the marriage i n c l u d i n
t h e balance owing 3*.i
ana n c . i Pla.ru

,ie >v torne) fee h e r e i n in the sum of $200.00

fr harmless therefrom.
«-- -O

DATED t h i < = ^

^ ^ , ^ "

• ~

o5,!

*' 7 ; .

,

? •

JUDG:

<iilIlllJJL-I

I.

ROBERT VAN SCIVER
Attorney for Defendant
321 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

322-5678

r»*.«„*v /•!»«.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WANDA MARIE SACKETT BAGSHAW,
Plaintiff,

j
:

PETITION FOR
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

J

VS.

JOSEPH ARTHUR BAGSHAW,
Defendant.
)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)

:

Civil No. D-6775

STATE OF UTAH

ss.

Joseph? Arthur Bagshaw, the defendant above named
petitions the Court as follows:
1.
matter.

That he is the defendant in the above entitled

That he is unable to read, and it was represented

to the defendant by the plaintiff that if he executed certain
documents, there would be no alimony.
2.

That the Decree of Divorce entered herein

provides for alimony and based upon such misrepresentations,
the defendant acquiesced in the securing of a Decree of
Divorce.

Therefore, the same should be modified eliminating

that provision relating to alimony.
3*

Further, that there has been the taking by

the plaintiff of an income tax return, a portion of which
should be paid to the defendant.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for the issuance of
an Order to Show Cause, requiring the plaintiff to appear

000014

v
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:v. „ e ; r e t

"fi^ct
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t h e inco.iit, u x r e t u r n t,

'I'""'/

t c r e t u r n a per* « or of

-he defendar*

7^
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orce \*

'JOSEPH ARTHUR BAGSHAW

day of May, 1973, personally

*"

appeared

before me Joseph Arthur Bagshaw, w h o duly acknowl edged to
ne that he signed t h e foregoing voluntarily? that t h e contents
t he re o f are t ru e an d co r r e ct to th e b e s t o £ h I s 1 :: now 1 e d g e ,
3 x c ep t a s t o ma 11 e r s s t a ted on In f o rma t i on an d b e .3 1 e £

an d
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ROBERT VAN SCIVER
Attorney for Defendant
321 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
322-5678
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WANDA MARIE SACKETT BAGSHAW,
Plaintiff,

!

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

vs.
JOSEPH ARTHUR BAGSHAW,
Defendant.

:
:

Civil No. D-6775

The above entitled matter came on for hearing upon
the verified Petition of the defendant herein.

Upon motion

of Robert Van Sciver, Attorney for Defendant, and good cause
appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff, Wanda
Marie Sackett Bagshaw be and appear before the above entitled
Court on the .•/^iay of
hour of /S'/f

«6Lj&

1973, at the

/4 M. in courtroom number

/

, 240 East

Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, to then and there show
cause, if any she has, why the following Order should not be
entered:
A.

Modifying the Decree of Divorce to reflect

that the plaintiff is awarded no alimony.
B.

Ordering plaintiff to return a portion of the

income tax return to the defendant.
DATED this Xr^aay of^fety, 19 73.
BY THE COURT:
- P
.W. STERWO'LVANS

DISTRICT JUDGE
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I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIKD

TODXCTXjP^W*telg*»»wW

uUt^T

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTA&UG ^JL ^9QQ
H OIXON J^^CLERK3ro0iST
^
C0t!<
BY.

WANDA MARIE SACKETT BAGSHAW,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY

OEPUTY CLERK

vs.
JOSEPH ARTHUR BAGSHAW,

CIVIL NO. D-6775

Defendant.

This Court is not persuaded that the parties arrived at an
enforceable stipulation to modify the Decree of Divorce to
eliminate alimony. Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah App. 1987).
Counsel for the plaintiff is to prepare the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment.
Dated this

day of August, 1988,

jTTEST
H OlXpN HifJDLEY

QopwyOfcrk

000U8J

- *m
Cierk 3rd Oist. Court

JOHN SPENCER SNOW, No. 3026
SN0Wr HALLIDAY & BAKER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Telephone:
(801) 364-4940

IN THE THIRD

[ > o ' i t v C!*>r!<

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IN AMD FOR SI '

AKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

WANDA MARIE SACKETT BAGSFIAW,
FINDINGS OP FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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of proof.

The domestic relations commissioner further found that

there was no evidence of unlawful cohabitation and that the State
of Utah had no interest in any portion of the alimony judgment in
favor

of

the

plaintiff.

The domestic relations commissioner

further found that the plaintiff had the right
said

decree

of

divorce

without

to rely

modification.

The domestic

relations commissioner made no specific recommendation
payment of
objection

attorney fees and costs.
to

commissioner

the

recommendation

and

sought

entered on the 6th
further filed
dated

the

day

of

a motion

6th
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day
of
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as to the

The said defendant filed an
of

the

evidentiary
April,

domestic
hearing

1988.

The

relations

by

pleading

said defendant

to enter stipulation, order and judgment

of
the

April,

1988.

The

objection

to the

domestic relations commissioner and the

motion to enter stipulation,
defendant came

upon the

order

and

judgment

and

the said

on for hearing before the above entitled court on

the 21st day of July,

1988,

at

the

hour

of

9:00

a.m.

The

plaintiff was present in person and represented by her respective
attorney, John Spencer Snow, and
person

and

Gaither.
and

represented

by

the

his

defendant

respective

Witnesses for both plaintiff

testified,

including

the

heard

the

evidence

and

reviewed

present in

attorney,

and defendant

parties

exhibits were introduced into evidence.

was

themselves.

Randall

were sworn
Certain

The above entitled court

the exhibits introduced into

evidence and made specific findings that there was no unlawful
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imw mdkefa the fol lowing

FINDINGS OP FACT
1

1 " p ! 1 ini " * f "Ji'l rnjr commit any
1

cohabitati m subsHquf ni

•*• ^a nf

unlawful

in ( M M pulry ui the decree of divorce In

this acn.:-,.
»"

M

J

stipulation between

' ei" "

1 'ii'J-

ihp parties as

'ha:

App

as require"I

ny Brown

WJS

neither

a

evidenced by a signed writing

nor an "tgreement nf t he parties stated
the record

there

in court before a judge on

v , Hi • >wn

144 t .id 333 lUtnh

1'18'n
1

There was no I PI 11. I .mi' I

f alimony

by reason of

the actions or the plain* I n

3
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4.

The

parties

did

not

arrive

at

an enforceable

stipulation on or about the 28th day of November, 1973.
5.

The alimony provision in the decree of divorce was

in full force and effect from and after its entry by the court to
and including the present time.
6.

The parties did

stipulation to

not

enter

into

any enforceable

modify the decree of divorce to terminate alimony

by the defendant to the plaintiff.
7.
has not

The alimony remains in

been terminated

full force

and effect and

by the defendant by prior order of this

court.
From the foregoing

findings

of

fact,

the

court now

enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
defendant in

Plaintiff
the sum

is

entitled

of $19,400.00

to
to and

judgment

against the

including March 31,

1988.
2.

The

motion

to

enter

a

stipulation,

order and

judgment of the said defendant is hereby denied.
3.

The

plaintiff

did

not

unlawfully

cohabit

subsequent to the entry of the decree of divorce.
4.

There is

not enforceable stipulation entered into

by and between the parties subsequent to the entry of
of divorce

to terminate

the obligation

the decree

of the defendant to pay

alimony to the plaintiff.

4

000x33

5,

li

\M

J

/

is urdered

to pay

for bis or her own

respective attorney fees n ml fur Mists of court

Incurred In this

action.
JO / . i,

DATED this

, 1988.

ENNIS FREDERICK
u^t Judge

TTEST

Approved as to form

J/
RANDALL GAI
Attorney fo
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H. 0IXON H1NOLEY
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